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IN THE UTAH COURT OF * PPEALS

STATE OF UTAH.
Plaint if£ Appellee,
Case No 20000982-C A
vs.
Priority No. 2

JAMES W. RAGGETT,
Defendant \ \ ppellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
I'llifi l i»li' uiiiotd il s "J"< "\« H?)le).

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

constiti:* ' *u Jiiense of forgery as defined by ^utii v^^de Annotated § 76-6-501.
This issue presents this Court with a question of law reviewed for correctness.
See State v. UaiL
11 i *>stic

' V O I.

i appeal was raised in ' :-cllant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on August

9, 2000, (R. 14-1S,, and was addressed at the hearing on August 25, 20O0. (R. 56 at 3-6).

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 7QA-3-109
Payable to bearer or to order
(1) A promise or order is payable to the bearer if it:
(b) does not state a payee;
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-407
Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property,
A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to have been lost or
mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the
recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without taking
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when he
obtains the property or at any time prior to taking the measures designated
in paragraph (1).
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501
Forgery— Writing Defined
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes,
or utters any writing so that the writing or the making , completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original existed.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Baggett appeals from the September 22, 2000, Judgement, Sentence, and
Commitment of the Honorable Guy R. Bumingham, Fourth District Court, after a denial
of a motion to dismiss and the entry of a conditional plea to attempted forgery.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

On July 11, 2000, Baggett was charged with one count of Forgery, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 (R. 3).
On August 9, 2000, Baggett filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. 14-18). Appellant's
Motion to Dismiss was heard, considered, and denied in the Fourth District Court by
Judge Guy R. Bumingham on August 25, 2000 (R. 33-36, 56 at 3-6).
On September 1, 2000, Baggett entered into a conditional plea of "No Contest" to
charges of attempted forgery, pending the outcome of this appeal (R. 30, 37-39). On
September 22, 2000, Baggett was sentenced but said sentence was stayed by Judge
Bumingham while this matter was appealed (R. 42-43). On October 20, 2000, Baggett
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court (R. 45).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On July 3, 2000, Daryll Allen made out a check in the amount of $110.00. Allen

signed the check but left the "payee" portion of check blank. (R. 36).

3

2.

The check was then lost in the Provo City Center area. Upon discovering that the

check was missing, Allen reported the missing check to First Security Bank on July 3,
2000. (R. 36).
3.

On July 3, 2000, Baggett entered into a First Security branch in Orem and uttered

the check to a teller for cashing. Baggett was now named on the check as payee (R. 35).
Baggett told the bank teller that he had been given the check as payment (R. 35).
4.

Baggett was detained at the Orem bank and after Miranda warnings were given,

confessed to finding the check in Provo and filling in the "payee" portion of the check.
(R. 35).
5.

Baggett was charged with Forgery on July 11, 2000. (R. 3).

6.

On August 9, 2000, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that his act of

filling-in the "payee" portion of the check does not constitute forgery because Baggett did
not complete or utter any writing "purporting to be the act of another" (R. 14-18).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The filling in a payee's name on a check that does not name a payee and
presenting it for payment is not an act of forgery because such action it does not
constitute the completion or utterance of a writing purporting to be the act of another as
required by Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. Baggett asserts that his actions, at best,
constitute theft of lost or mislaid property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-6-407
4

ARGUMENT
Baggett asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the provisions of the
Utah Commercial Code governing the making, issuing and transferring of negotiable
instruments is in applicable to this case. In order to convict Baggett of forgery under
these facts, the State had to prove that he completed a writing—in this case a check.
Baggett asserts that it is the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code which determines
when a check is complete as a negotiable instrument.
A check is a negotiable instrument. See Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-3-104.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code states that a promise or order to pay in a negotiable
instrument can be made payable to either a named individual or to any bearer and that a
promise or order is payable to the bearer if it "does not state a payee." U.C.A. § 70A-3
109(l)(b). Utah Code Annotated § 70A-1-201(5) defines "bearer" as "the person in
possession of an instrument... payable to bearer or indorsed in blank."
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code defines
a negotiable instrument from four criteria: " Specifically, it must (1) evidence a signature
by the maker or drawer, (2) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money, (3) be payable on demand or at a definite time, and (4) be payable to
order or to bearer." Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah, 1986). Baggett
asserts that when he found the check, it was already a completed negotiable instrument.
One, the check was signed by the maker. Two, the check contained an unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain in money. Three, the check was payable on demand. Four,
5

the check was payable to the bearer-Baggett—because it did not state a payee.
Accordingly, Judge Burningham's conclusion that the check was not complete until
Baggett filled in his name as payee is erroneous because the check was already a
completed writing or negotiable instrument which was payable to him as bearer prior to
his act of writing his name on the check as payee.
In State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151, (Utah, 1963), a case in which a defendant
was convicted of issuing a bad check, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the instrument
the defendant had issued was, indeed, a check even though the defendant had not named
an identifiable payee. The Court stated:
It is well settled by authority that the omission to insert in an instrument the name
of a payee is not a feature or a defect which affects negotiability. The effect of the
omission to name a payee is to invest any bona fide holder with the authority to fill in the
blank left for that purpose by the drawer or maker. Such instruments are payable to the
bearer until restricted in their currency as negotiable instruments by the insertion of the
name of some particular payee.
385 P.2d at 151-52.
Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, the check uttered by Appellant
was a complete negotiable instrument, payable to any bearer. Appellant, in inserting his
name in the blank space provided to name the payee, did not complete the check or
commit an act "purporting to be the act of another." Rather, by leaving the check blank
as to the payee, the maker, himself, had already completed the writing and made the
check payable to any bearer, including Baggett and that no action was taken by Baggett

6

which purported to be the act of the maker because the check was already payable to him
as bearer as per Donaldson.
Moreover, Baggett asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that he uttered
the check so as to purport it to be the act of another (R. 34). Black's Law Dictionary
(Sixth Edition) at page 1547 defines "utter" in relation to forgery statutes as follows: "To
utter, as used in a statute against forgery and counterfeiting, means to offer, whether
accepted or not, a forged instrument, with the representation, by words or actions, that the
same is genuine." The check found by Baggett that he presented to the bank was not a
forged instrument because it was already a completed negotiable instrument/writing at the
time he found it. When the maker signed the check, made it payable for a specific dollar
amount on demand to any bearer he authorized payment to any bearer including Baggett;
Baggett, in presenting the check to the bank to be cashed, did not—and legally could not—
take any action purporting to be that of another because he as bearer he was already
legally entitled to utter that check.
Admittedly, when Baggett found the check on the street, he reasonable knew that it
had been lost. In addition, he made no reasonable effort to return it to Allen, and
evidenced an intent to deprive Allen of the funds represented by the check. Under these
facts Baggett is probably guilty of theft of lost or mislaid property under Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-407. Baggett asserts, however, that he is not guilty of forgery because
he neither completed a writing or uttered a forged writing purporting to be the act of
another.
7

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons asserted heretofore, Baggett respectfully requests that this Court
correct the trial court's conclusion that his action legally constituted the offense of
forgery. Appellant further prays this Court to remand this case back to the trial court and
for withdrawal of Baggett's plea and prosecution under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-407.
DATED this

( day of April, 2001.

Margaret/. Lindsay
£/
Attorney for the Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, Heber
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT
84114, t h i s / I day of April, 2001.
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ADDENDA
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Thomas H. Means (2222)
Utah County Public Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah, 84601
(801)379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
'k-k-k'k'k'k'k'k

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
JAMES W. BAGGETT,
Hon. Guy R. Burningham
Defendant.
MOTION
COMES NOW, JAMES W. BAGGETT, by and through his
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to Rule
25(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, hereby moves
for this Court's Order dismissing the Information filed in this
matter for the reason that the allegations of such Information do
not constitute the crime charged in the Information.
FACTS
Without admitting to the following facts, Defendant
believes the State's factual assertions relevant to this motion

are set forth in the investigating officer's probable cause
statement. The probable cause affidavit filed in this case by
Orem City Officer McCombs indicates that the Defendant is alleged
to have filled in his name on the "pay to order of" line on a
check he had found and thereafter attempted to cash the check.
The check had been signed by the owner of the account, Derryl
Allen who lost the check somewhere in Provo. Mr. Allen had not
filled in a named payee; the "pay to the order of" line was left
blank. Mr. Allen did not know Defendant and had intended to use
the check to purchase two badges.
ARGUMENT
Summary of Argument:
The completion of a check by filling in a payee's name
on a check that does not name a payee is not an act of forgery;
Defendant's actions are at best theft of lost or mislaid property
in the amount of $110.00, a class B misdemeanor.
******

A check is a negotiable instrument.1 A promise or order
to pay in a negotiable instrument can be made payable to either a

Sections 70A-3-104(a) and 70A-3-104(f).
2

named individual or to any bearer (holder)2. The Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code defines a
negotiable instrument from four criteria: "Specifically, it must
(i) evidence a signature by the maker or drawer, (ii) contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money,
(iii) be payable on demand or at a definite time, and (iv) be
payable to order or to bearer."3 A negotiable instrument is
payable to the bearer if the instrument does not state a payee.4
In a case in which a defendant was convicted of issuing
a bad check, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the instrument the
defendant had issued was, indeed, a check even though the
defendant had not named an identifiable payee.
It is well settled by authority that the
omission to insert in an instrument the name of a payee
is not a feature or a defect which affects
negotiability. The effect of the omission to name a
payee is to invest any bona fide holder with the
authority to fill in the blank left for that purpose by
the drawer or maker. Such instruments are payable to
the bearer until restricted in their currency as
negotiable instruments by the insertion of the name of
some particular payee.5
2

Section 70A-3-109.

3

Calfo v D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1986).

'Section 70A-3-109(a) (2) .
5

State v Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah, 1963).
3

Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, the check
uttered by Defendant was a complete negotiable instrument,
payable to any bearer. Defendant, in inserting his name in the
blank space provided to name the payee, did not commit an act
"purporting to be the act of another". Rather, by leaving the
check blank as to a payee, the maker, himself, made the check
payable to any bearer, including this Defendant. And, as per
Donaldson, as a bearer, Defendant had legal authority to fill in
the blank space meant to identify a payee.
Admittedly, when he found the check on the street,
Defendant may have known it had been lost, made no reasonable
effort to return it to Mr. Allen, and evidenced an intent to
deprive Allen of the funds represented by the check. Because the
value of the funds thus taken was $110.00, Defendant is more
properly prosecuted under Section 76-6-407, Theft of Lost or
Misplaced property, a class B misdemeanor.
Dated August 9, 2000.

Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT^/WRT^'^^/'i;^';-,:
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

P/f.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

) CASE NO. 001402693

JAMES BAGGETT,

) Motion to Quash

Defendant.
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Friday, August 25, 2 000
MR. MEANS:

It's my motion, so I111 go ahead.

Frankly, I don't know how much I can add to the written
motion that I made, which is my impression, what little I
know about commercial paper is -THE COURT:

This isn't a case under the uniform

commercial code.
MR. MEANS:

I understand.

THE COURT:

And under the forgery statute it says,

"completion upon making, completing."

And the allegation is

that he completed the writing by inserting his name.
MR. MEANS:

Right.

Here is how I see it, judge --

THE COURT:

And he had no right to do that.

I

understand what you are - - i n effect you're saying, that he
stole the money.
MR. MEANS:
it.

I think it's a given that he completed

I would be focusing on purporting to be the act of

another, because, again, I think you have to fall back to
commercial paper law to recognize that if you create the
check, put all of the other elements in place -THE COURT:

It's a negotiable instrument.

MR. MEANS:

--it makes a negotiable instrument.

THE COURT:

But he made it a forgery by completing

it, by making it payable to himself.
MR. MEANS:

As I say, he did complete it, but I
Utah State Courts
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1

don f t think you can say thatf s purporting to be the act of

2

another if the commercial paper law says you can create a

3

check, leave a name off, and by operation of law it becomes

4

payable to the bearer.

5

maker makes it payable to bearer as soon as he fails to

6

insert a name.

7

it, he hasn't purported to be the act of another.

8
9

So my position would be that the

So even though the Defendant has completed

THE COURT:

I think it f s an interesting argument,

but again it seems to fall squarely within the language of

10

the forgery statute.

11

if he had found it already made payable to cash, and all he

12

did -- they may have required him to endorse it, then I think

IS-

the commercial paper argument has more credibility because

14

he ! s only stolen the same as if he had stolen cash.

15

actually completed it, and that language is there, if he

16

completes it.

17

MR. MEANS:

Even if he had made it payable to cash,

But he

If I understand the commercial code,

18

leaving it blank creates a cash equivalent as if it were cash

19

or had it written in cash, so that it's the same act.

20

THE COURT;

It makes it negotiable.

In other words,

21

someone who receives something like that and is authorized to

22

insert their name -- on the payee line, is it?

23

authorized to do that, they can do that under the commercial

24

code.

25

the negotiability of the instrument because bonified --

If they ! re

If they're not authorized, though, it doesn't destroy

Utah State Courts
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MR. MEANS: Holders.
THE COURT:
end up with it.

Purchasers or holders in due course may

And so that protects them, if somebody

actually will take that risk.

So while he took the risk,, it

doesnft relieve someone else who is the wrong-doer and fits
within the statute.

Like I said, I did read it.

MR. MEANS:

I can't add much more to it than that.

That's just my theory.
THE COURT:

It may be a basis for you to take it up,

if the same act in this case is a misdemeanor and a felony.
But to me, the forgery statute does fit in the context in
which it was done.

So I would deny your motion, I guess, to

dismiss the felony —
MR. MEANS:
MR. LARSON:

is that where we are?
Right.

Let me talk with Mr. Larson.

Thank you for those oral arguments,

judge.
THE COURT:

Well, I had read both of your memos, and

it is an interesting question.
THE CLERK:

So motion to quash denied?

THE COURT:

Was this a motion to quash or motion to

MR. MEANS:

Actually a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT:

Oh, you waived prelim.

dismiss.
We

waived.

to dismiss.
Utah State Courts

So it's a motion
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MR. MEANS:
have to come back.

No matter how we do this, we111 probably
But we're contemplating entering a plea,

but we'll need to put that in writing.

So if we could have

another date?
THE COURT:
following week?

Do you want to do it next week or the

The 1st or the 8th of September?

MR. MEANS:

One week would be fine, Judge.

On your

morning calendar?
THE COURT:

We could do it at 10:00 o'clock,

September 1st, at 10.
MR. MEANS:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I think it's a good one for appeal,

quite frankly.
(Proceedings concluded.)

Utah State Courts

Fourth Judicial District e«urt
of Utah County. State of Utah

C. KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

JAMES BAGGETT

:

Defendant (s) .

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Case No. 001402693

:

JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM
DIVISION 8

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. The Court, having received and considered the Motion,
together with memoranda in support and opposition thereto, and oral
arguments taken at hearing held on August 25, 2000, being apprised
on the premises, now enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Pursuant to apparent stipulation of the parties, the Court
finds the following pertinent facts:
1.

That on 7/3/2000 the victim made out a check in the amount
of $110.00.

He signed it, but left the "payee" portion

blank.
2.

That the check was then lost in the Provo City area.
l

3.

That the victim immediately notified the bank of the lost
check.

4.

That on 7/3/2000 the defendant entered a branch of the bank
in Orem and uttered the check to a teller for cashing.

At

this time the check was complete, the defendant now being
named as payee on the check.
5.

The defendant told the teller that "the victim gave him the
check as a payment."

6.

That the defendant did not have the owner's authorization to
complete the check by placing the defendant's name in its
payee portion/blank.

7.

That the defendant did not know the owner.

8.

That the defendant made no effort to locate the check's
owner, nor return the check to the owner.

9.

That the defendant was not given the check by the owner as a
form of payment.

10.

That the defendant found the check in Provo City, completed
the check by filling in his name as payee, and then uttered
it to the teller to be cashed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court, having considered this matter, and being fully
apprised on the premises, now enters conclusions of law as
follows:

2

1.

That the laws governing the making, issuing and transferring
of negotiable instruments pursuant to the Utah Commercial
Code, comprising sections 70A-3-101 et seq.,

Utah Code

Annotated 1953 as amended ("UCA"), do not apply to the
matter before the bar.
2.

That provisions of sections 76-6-501, et seq.,

UCA, which

govern, and define, the criminal act of forgery, apply to
this matter.
3.

That pursuant to section 76-6-501(2), UCA, the check in
question is a "writing."

4.

That pursuant to section 76-6-501(1), a person may commit
the criminal offense of forgery if he:
with purpose to defraud anyone . . . completes, . . . or
utters any writing so that the writing or the . . .
completion, . . . or utterance purports to be the act of
another, . . . . [Editing added.]

5.

That the defendant did complete the writing, by entering his
name into its payee section, without authorization of the
writing's owner.

6.

That the defendant did utter the writing to the bank teller.

7.

That the defendant did complete and utter the writing with
the purpose to defraud anyone.

8.

That the defendant did complete and utter the writing so as
to purport it to be the act of another.

3

ORDER
The court having entered appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and being fully apprised on the premises, now
enters the following:
BE IT ORDERED AND DECREED:
That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

DATED this

z

day of

, 2000
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM
TOM MEANS
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT
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